What It Means
- The pork MAV expansion under Executive Order 116 raises pork import access from 54,210 metric tons to 204,210 metric tons over two years, with 30,000 MT to processors and 120,000 MT routed through Food Terminal Inc. and the Kadiwa ng Pangulo program.
- Hog farmer groups SINAG, NFHFI, and PROPORK publicly demanded the opposite policy direction in the weeks before EO 116 dropped. Their position was to restore pork import tariffs to 40 percent MFN and 30 percent MAV, not to expand quota volume.
- Farmgate prices have remained at ₱180 to ₱190 per kilo for seven straight months, against production costs of ₱170 to ₱180 per kilo. Backyard and commercial raisers were already operating at or below breakeven before EO 116.
- The Department of Agriculture proposed the 150,000 MT volume. The DA Secretary chairs the MAV Management Committee that recommended the expansion to Malacañang. The same Secretary brokered the ₱210 per kilo farmgate floor with hog farmers in November 2025.
- The 2021 record under EO 133, which used the same mechanism, delivered ₱3.67 billion in foregone tariff revenue with no measurable reduction in retail pork prices. SINAG and ProPork documented the outcome at the time.
President Ferdinand Marcos signed Executive Order 116 on May 19, 2026, quadrupling the minimum access volume (MAV) for pork imports from 54,210 metric tons to 204,210 metric tons over two years. The order, made public May 22, allocates 30,000 MT to meat processors and 120,000 MT to Food Terminal Inc. and the Kadiwa ng Pangulo program. The MAV Management Committee, chaired by Agriculture Secretary Francisco Tiu Laurel Jr., recommended the expansion. The 150,000 MT figure originated inside the DA.
Major outlets framed the pork MAV expansion as a presidential response to African Swine Fever supply gaps and consumer price pressure. The producer side reads it differently. The producer side has been on record asking for the opposite policy direction for at least seven months.
Producers Asked for the Opposite Policy Direction
On May 22, 2026, twenty-four hours before EO 116 was made public, the Samahang Industriya ng Agrikultura issued a public statement on hog farmgate prices. The group reported farmgate at ₱180 to ₱190 per kilo for seven straight months. Live hog production cost sits at ₱170 to ₱180 per kilo. The margin had collapsed.
SINAG demanded that the government restore pork import tariffs to 40 percent MFN and 30 percent MAV, the rates that applied before Executive Order 62 cut them in 2024. The group’s direct statement: “Repeatedly increasing imports and reducing tariffs have not delivered lower consumer prices, while undermining domestic producers in the process.”
In February 2026, National Federation of Hog Farmers Vice Chairman Alfred Ng told BusinessWorld that the December and January demand peak, normally the most reliable price recovery window in the year, had failed for the first time in three decades. “For the first time in more than 30 years of hog farming, liveweight prices did not improve in December and continued to decline in January,” he said. The NFHFI position was the same as SINAG. Restore tariffs to 40 percent. Do not expand quota.
In April 2026, when the DA tried the same MAV Plus approach with chicken, poultry producers rejected the proposal outright, citing overproduction and depressed farmgate prices. The DA’s own statement to Philstar acknowledged the rejection.
Three producer groups. Three separate public statements over seven months. One consistent ask: restore tariffs, do not expand quota. The pork MAV expansion under EO 116 ignored all of it.
The Floor That the DA Brokered, Then Helped Cancel
On November 4, 2025, the DA convened a meeting with SINAG, NFHFI, and the Pork Producers Federation of the Philippines. The groups reported farmgate at ₱150 to ₱180 per kilo. The DA brokered a minimum farmgate price of ₱210 per kilo. In its own press release, the agency stated it would recommend restoring the pork import tariff to 40 percent under EO 62.
Tiu Laurel said directly: “Lower import duties have encouraged over-importation. This has flooded the market, squeezed local producers, and endangered both our food security and farmers’ livelihoods.” That statement is on the DA’s own website. The Secretary named the exact mechanism that EO 116 now uses.
Three weeks later, the same Secretary told BusinessWorld: “Right now, we can’t raise the MAV because of the low farmgate price. It’s not the right time.”
Six months later, with farmgate still below the ₱210 floor, his committee recommended the pork MAV expansion to the President. The floor was never enforced. The tariff restoration never happened. The producer groups got the opposite of what they were promised in November.
The Damage Lands Unevenly Across the Pork Industry
The pork MAV expansion lands on three different producer segments, and the damage is not evenly distributed.
Backyard raisers
Backyard raisers are the most exposed. They operate on thin margins, limited credit access, and no cold storage capacity to absorb timing shocks. Imported dressed pork lands at ₱80 to ₱100 per kilo. Local pork costs roughly ₱206 per kilo after slaughter. The MAV expansion widens that gap by lowering landed cost on 150,000 additional MT per year. Backyard raisers exit. The herd rebuild that the sector has tried to mount since African Swine Fever cut the national inventory from 13 million heads to 8 million stalls again.
Small to mid-sized commercial raisers
Small to mid-sized commercial raisers carry the second wave. They have higher capital exposure, longer payback cycles, and feed inputs that have not come down in cost. The pork MAV expansion pushes their farmgate prices below the production cost the DA itself acknowledged in November. Several will consolidate or sell. Others will exit. The herd contraction continues.
Large integrated producers
Large integrated producers with vertical control over feed, breeding stock, and cold chain absorb the shock differently. Some operate as both producer and importer. Some have meat processor subsidiaries that receive the 30,000 MT processor allocation directly. For these players, the pork MAV expansion is not a threat. It is a margin shift between business lines they already own.
The structural outcome of the pork MAV expansion is concentration. The Philippine pork industry that exists 24 months after EO 116 takes effect will be smaller, more vertically integrated, and more dependent on imported supply. The 8 million-head herd contracts further. Repopulation, already projected as a multi-year recovery, extends.
That is the producer-side read on the mechanism. It is also the read SINAG and ProPork documented in 2021 under Executive Order 133, the last time MAV expansion was used as a price-stabilization tool. ProPork President Rolando Tambago said at the time: “Since issuance of those EOs, there was no tangible reduction of pork retail prices. What happened instead was it gave further sufferings for local swine farmers.” Customs data placed foregone tariff revenue at ₱3.67 billion in eight months. Consumer pork prices stayed at ₱350 to ₱400 per kilo.
The pork MAV expansion under EO 116 uses the same mechanism. The producer-side response will not be different from 2021. The empirical record is now five years long. The next ₱3.67 billion in foregone tariff revenue will be the price of repeating it.
The producer groups have said so already. They were saying so the day before the EO was signed.
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